

NEW PROOFS OF THE SOUL'S EXISTENCE

S. S. HEBBERD


UC-NRLF



\$B 285 936

GIFT OF

She Argonaut.



EX LIBRIS



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2007 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

NEW PROOFS OF THE SOUL'S EXISTENCE

BY

S. S. HEBBERD

||



BOSTON
SHERMAN, FRENCH & COMPANY
1914

BD 421
H 4

COPYRIGHT, 1914
SHERMAN, FRENCH & COMPANY

PREFACE

Some will take offense at the very title of this book. The existence of the soul, they will say, has been discussed through thousands of years from every possible point of view. It is folly, then, to claim the discovery of new proofs that were hidden from the great masters of thought.

I answer that these new proofs are all rooted in the principle demonstrated in Chapter I — that all thinking is a relating of cause and effect. And whoever reads that chapter carefully will see that this demonstration could not have been made *until modern science had reached its present stage of development*. I am not posing, then, as a rival to the great masters of the past. But I occupy a privileged position whereby an insight can be gained, impossible in their day. Hence these new proofs of the soul's existence.

All Europe is now plunged in the greatest, most murderous war that the world has ever known. And in this sudden sinking of our civilization into the lowest depths of barbarism,

PREFACE

we are simply reaping a harvest the seeds of which were sown more than a century ago. A skeptical mania then began which has gradually undermined the belief in God and the soul. But man must worship; having rejected the true God, he grovels in the dust before the God of War. And if man is soulless, why should he not be hurried — like other animals — to the slaughter-house?

The issue of my book just now seems, then, opportune. For it is night that reveals the stars. And in this present night of horrors, people will be apt to give heed to proofs that God still reigns and souls exist.

S. S. II.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I THE NATURE OF THOUGHT . . .	1
II THE PERFECT CAUSE	28
III THE UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS . .	43
IV CONFLICT OF SENSE AND REASON . .	54
V FREEDOM	68
VI IMMORTALITY	77
VII CONCLUSION	85

NEW PROOFS OF THE
SOUL'S EXISTENCE

CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF THOUGHT

The chief problems of philosophy — and, above all, the problem of the soul — can be solved only by starting from a clear view of the nature of thought as distinguished from feeling. Hence I begin with an attempt to prove the following thesis: The essential function of all thinking is to interpret the given in terms of cause and effect.

It will naturally be demanded that, first of all, I define the causal relation. Cause, it will be said, is a word of many diverse meanings; and it will profit nothing to show that every form of thinking involves some dim shade of some one among these contrasted meanings. But evidently, if my thesis is true, there can be no formal definition of causality; for there is no wider genus under which it can be sub-sumed as a species with its special *differentia*.

But this difficulty is not insuperable. For it will be shown as we proceed that *there is but one perfect type of causality*; and that all these diverse meanings are but so many phases or de-

gress of imperfection evinced as we descend from that perfect type.

SECTION 1. SUBSTANCE AND ATTRIBUTE

Let us, then, first take thinking in its simplest form, i. e., those perceptive judgments which connect things and their qualities. What now is the relation between the qualities and the thing qualified? We all know the old answer handed down from Aristotle through the ages. The qualities inhere in the thing — stick in it, as it were — like pins in a pin-cushion. Against this familiar but absurd view, I maintain that the real relation between the thing and its attributes is that of cause and effect. The thing is the *partial* cause of its attributes.

Note, above all, the significance of the limiting term — the *partial* cause. The first maxim of modern science is that no finite, sensible thing is the complete cause of an effect. The true cause of any effect is complex; many different things or agencies are woven together as factors in the causal process whence any given effect or change results. But modern philosophy has been strangely blind to this axiom of modern science; and this blindness has led to a virtual discarding of causation as a vague, ambiguous term useless in systematic thinking. "Cause," says Martineau, for instance, "ap-

pears at one time as a thing or object in space; in another as a prior phenomenon; and again, as a definite force identical with neither. In assigning the cause of the daily tides, for example, you may name the moon or the rotation of the earth or the gravitation of the related masses." He does not see that each of these is but a partial cause, a factor in the complex process producing the tides. In like manner Wundt and Sigwart dispute: the one insisting that the cause of every event is some prior event, the other that substances also are causes.¹ All such confusion and wrangling might have been avoided by remembering that the substance is indeed a cause, but a partial one, a factor in the causal complex producing the attribute.

Note further that the thing or substance, though only a partial cause, occupies a privileged and pre-eminent position. For it is the only factor that persists, that operates in one and all of the many different processes by which its many attributes are severally produced.

Again, it is the specific factor; the other factors are general conditions giving only general results. For example, the earth's attraction is such a condition determining the weight of things in general. But it is the structure of the thing itself which determines whether it shall be heavy as lead or light as a leaf. So

¹ Sigwart: *Logic*, II. 564-74.

with color: the ether-waves produce all manner of colors, but the structure of the thing determines its specific color.

These considerations are enough to prove my contention that the relation of substance to its attributes is that of a partial cause to many effects produced under varying circumstances. And yet it is but one half of the proof. The other and more important half consists in showing that only this view explains certain perplexities that have long darkened the conception of substance and attributes into a midnight of enigma and self-contradiction.

(1) First of all, consider the well-known logical riddle: if from the substance we take away the attributes nothing remains; conversely, if from the attributes we take away the substance, again we have nothing left; thus substance and attribute taken apart seem to be but two nothings. But the error lies in regarding substance and attribute as two distinct things. Rise above this childish view. Interpret substance and attribute in terms of cause and effect. Then you see at once that a cause which has no effect is not a cause, and that an effect which has no cause is not an effect.

(2) Another and still graver opposition which philosophy has for centuries been vainly striving to reconcile is that of identity and diversity. Hegel rightly insisted that difference

was even more essential to a true concept or universal than was mere resemblance.² But he erred fatally in supposing that this union of identity and difference was self-contradictory. He did not see that all thinking was a relating of cause and effect. And that the very essence of such a relation was that it at once differentiated between the cause and its effect, and yet united them by the firmest of bonds.

(3) Another famous opposition is that of the One and the Many. Philosophers as wide apart as Hegel and Herbart agree that one thing with many qualities is a flagrant case of self-contradiction. Bergson believes that this difficulty can be overcome by rising above mere intellect into the cloud-land of his sympathetic intuition or "Creative élan." But there is no need of these strange devices. Unity and multiplicity when interpreted in terms of cause and effect are not contradictory, as we have seen; the one thing is the central factor in many different processes of causation, each of which imparts to that thing a different aspect or quality.

(4) Still another opposition is that of permanence and change. Hegel would reconcile these by abolishing time. Bergson, by confining mere intellect to a knowledge of the permanent, while "a kind of *intellectual auscultation*

² Bosanquet, *Individuality*, etc., devotes 50 pages to this truth, pp. 31-81.

6 THE SOUL'S EXISTENCE

tion,"³ reveals the throbbings of incessant change or restless becoming. But for such fancies I would substitute the simple fact that the thought of causation necessarily involves both permanence and change. The cause is relatively permanent, the effect relatively changeful. In other words, the two reciprocally qualify each other; we know the cause through its effects and conversely the effects through their causes.

Thus these four phantoms of self-contradiction which have so long disquieted the philosophic world seem to vanish in the light of the view here maintained. And this is the other half of my proof that the relation of substance to its attributes is that of a partial cause to its many effects.

SECTION 2. CONCEPTS

A threefold difficulty infests the problem of concepts or universals. The first two concern the double meaning of the concept, its extension and intension. The third is the question, handed down from the Middle Ages, whether concepts really exist, or are but mere names. And these three inter-tangle into a hard knot which philosophy as yet has failed to untie.

Let us see, then, whether this knot can be

³ Bergson: *Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 36.

untied by the aid of our principle that all thinking is a relating of cause and effect. A universal, I hope to show, means something more than a collection of individuals or a bundle of attributes or a mere name. Its deepest meaning is a *process of causation producing uniform results*. The proof thereof can be given here only in outline, but still clearly enough, I trust, to be convincing. If any reader should still doubt, let him refer to my *Philosophy of the Future* (pp. 93-112) where the proof is given in greater detail.

The primitive view of the concept — a view that stood unchallenged until a century ago — was crude and superficial. It saw in the concept naught but a collection of resembling objects. The extension expressed the objects, the intension their resemblance. But a rude shock was given to this venerable view by Hegel's invention of "the concrete universal." To him belongs the honor of being the first European to see that the old view of the concept necessarily involved universal self-contradiction. To conceive anything was to place it in a collection of *like* objects. But instantly the counter-thought arose that these objects were, in many respects, *not like* each other. Thus every concept becomes a palpable self-contradiction. Or, as that eminent Hegelian, McTaggart, puts it: "But everything is, as we

have seen, Unlike every other thing. And it is also Like every other thing, for in any possible group we can, as we have seen, find a common quality. Thus under this category everything has exactly the same relation to everything else. For it is both Like and Unlike everything else.”⁴

But though Hegel did well in unveiling the contradictoriness of the concept as ordinarily construed, his substitute — the concrete universal — can hardly be deemed a success. It raises far more difficulties than it removes. The true solution is that every relation of mere likeness or difference, in order to become self-consistent and intelligible, *must be converted into a causal relation* by stating upon what the likeness or the unlikeness depends. When the vague, incoherent feeling of likeness and unlikeness thus evolves into the recognition of a causal relation, then only does real thinking begin. In fine, a concept, in its deepest meaning, signifies a causal process.

And strangely enough, all the great thinkers of every school seem finally driven around to this view of the concept. Above all, it was Plato's view. The definition of the Platonic concept is, according to Xenocrates: “A *cause* serving as the unchanging type of all natural things.” Hegel also says that “the

⁴ *Commentary on Hegel's Logic*, pp. 112, 113.

true universal is not merely some common element in all of that kind; it is their Ground, their Substance." Lotze wavers; at first he declares that universals are valid but non-existent: we are forced to think them real although we know that they are not real. But in the *Metaphysics* (§ 88) he swings around to the true view and says: "Color as the common element of various colors is not a scientific idea or concept. Discovery of a *process* of light-waves whose various rates constitute the various colors of the spectrum gives the concept."

Even such antagonists as Mill and Hamilton concur in yielding to this unconscious tide of all deep thinking. Hamilton declares that "in considering aught as a system or whole, *we think the parts as held together by a certain force.*" And Mill extols this "as one of the best and profoundest passages in all Sir William Hamilton's writings."⁵ (1) Even Hobbes, at this point, forgets his Nominalism; "these causes of names," he says, "are the same with the causes of our conceptions, namely, some power of action or affection of the thing conceived."⁶ (2) Thus all the rival schools seem somehow forced to concede that a concept means ultimately a causal process.

⁵ Mill: *Hamilton's Philosophy*, II, p. 67.

⁶ Mill: *Logic*, Bk. 1, chap. 5.

But there is an oft-urged objection which threatens the very existence of the concept. Recently it has been put with great skill by Bergson; in fact, it forms the centre and almost the circumference of his philosophy. The inherent difficulties of Metaphysic, its antinomies, contradictions, etc., he tells us, "arise from our professing to reconstruct reality with percepts whose function it is to make it stationary. But there are no means of reconstructing the mobility of the real with fixed concepts."⁷ This view that concepts, being fixed, changeless, static, cannot express the changes of reality Bergson expands into several volumes. But a complete answer to it can be given in a dozen lines or so. The causal processes which concepts express are, indeed, absolutely uniform; but that by no means necessitates the invariability of the effects. On the contrary, *it is this very uniformity of the process which brings about infinite variation in the results.* For example, it is the continuous action of gravity which causes the velocity of the falling stone to vary in each infinitesimal instant. So the process of causation that produces color is one, immutable, will persist as long as the cosmos lasts. But the colors and hues produced are of countless variety, interpenetrate or modify each other, vanish and return — are the perfect

⁷ Bergson: *Introduction to Metaphysics*, pp. 67, 69.

type of "becoming." In fine, concepts mean uniform processes, but their uniformity does not result in a static, changeless, paralyzed world.

Besides what has already been given there are two other lines of proof that the gist of a concept is to indicate a causal process. One line is derived from the origin of language, the other from the origin of science.

(1) It is a well established principle in philology that the majority of verbal roots express acts performed in a primitive state of society — such as digging, plaiting, weaving, binding, etc. Further they are generally co-operative acts; for only thus would they become known to all and only thus could their merely accidental elements be eliminated. Still more significant is Müller's statement that "the mere consciousness of these acts is not enough: only when the processes are such that their *results* remain perceptible — for example, in the hole dug, in the tree struck down, in the reeds tied together as a mat — do men reach conceptual thoughts in language." ^s

Or as another eminent philologist, Noiré, has said: "The conception of *causality subsisting between things*. Verily this constitutes such a simple, plain and convincing means of distin-

^s *Lectures on the Science of Thought*; 30.

guishing the logos, human reason from animal intelligence, it seems inconceivable that this manifest and clear boundary-line should not long ago have been noted and established as such.”⁹

Philology, then, confirms my thesis. Every word used in human speech has had its origin in the effort of primitive man to express those causal processes which he perceives in Nature or which he himself executes in common with his fellows.

(2) Still more conclusive is the testimony presented by man's prolonged effort to classify natural things. At a very early period, savage man had succeeded in classifying living things into their species or lowest kinds. But the inorganic things went unclassified. Even at the climax of ancient civilization, so great a genius as Aristotle could divide them only into these four absurd kinds: “the hot and dry, the hot and wet, the cold and dry, the cold and wet.” The reason is obvious. In the organic realm, the processes of production were perceptible; in the inorganic, they were hidden.

Furthermore, ancient classification, even of the organic, never reached beyond species. Until three centuries ago botanists knew of no grand divisions in the plant-world except “trees, shrubs and herbs.” But light dawned

⁹ *Origin of language*, p. 42.

at last when Gessner discovered that true genera could be formed by noting characteristics drawn from *the process of fructification*. Since then, as Darwin has said, "naturalists in their long search for a true or natural system of classification" have always been unconsciously guided, not by mere *resemblances*, but by the principle of inheritance."¹⁰ But the principle of inheritance is but another phrase for process of production. Thus the development of science adds another to our proofs that a concept means something more than an imaginary collection of resembling objects. In its deepest, widest meaning, the concept signifies the causal process which produces both the individuals and their attributes.

And under the guidance of this same principle, Darwin himself was led to that sublime discovery which has revolutionized modern thought.

(3) Finally, this view gives answer to a question that has baffled the ages. Do universals really exist or are they only figments of mind? I answer that if they do not exist, then nothing exists. True, we do not perceive the entirety of any causal process. We perceive only its component factors. The causal bond or force that weaves these components into one invariable process is unseen, and therefore has to be

¹⁰ *Origin of Species*, ch. 14.

inferred by thought. Do you object that this bond may be only an idle dream, a fiction of the mind? That indeed is a difficulty before which all philosophy heretofore has stood perplexed and powerless. But if I can prove that the sole essential function of thinking in all its forms is to affirm causation, then plainly to deny causation is to make all thinking essentially false. In fine, such a denial would logically involve the complete collapse and extinction of thought. And thus I leave the matter for the present.

SECTION III. INDUCTION

Logicians have long been very much at variance concerning the real nature of inductive thinking. To avoid their disputes, let us confine ourselves to historical facts—to a brief glance at some of the chief discoveries or inductions which have created modern science. It will thus be shown, I think, that all these great inductions have consisted essentially in the unveiling of some hidden or neglected factor in the causal processes of Nature.

(1) Consider the two chief inductions that gave birth to modern astronomy. (a) It had long been known that the rapid motion of the spectator would make stationary objects seem to move. But Copernicus revolutionized astronomy by proving that this simple fact was

the *neglected factor* in all previous views of the celestial mechanism. (b) Newton's induction was still more sublime; for he unveiled a factor that had been not merely neglected, but one so deeply hidden that no one had dreamed of its existence.

(2) The creation of optical science is another proof of my thesis. Here the paramount factor — refraction — had long been known as a strange illusion, a freak of nature that made the straight seem bent. But in the seventeenth century, Snell began an inductive study of this illusive phenomenon. He discovered the mathematical law governing its seeming irregularities. Very soon refraction, so long neglected, was seen to be the central factor in optical processes. From Snell's formula Descartes explained, in part at least, the splendid mystery of the rainbow. Then came Newton with his explanation of colors as due to different degrees of refrangibility: a new science had been born.

(3) In acoustics even Newton failed in his induction; his calculation of the velocity of sound made it much less than it really was. So acoustics was at a stand-still for almost a century. But at last La Place showed that here, too, there was a neglected factor. By the sudden compression of the air, heat was generated, and thus the wave-motion was greatly accelerated. Due allowance being made for this, the

calculated and observed velocities corresponded, and acoustics became an inductive science.

(4) The creation of chemical science is another proof that induction is an unveiling of the essential factors in a causal process. And strangely enough, the neglected factor here was the most potent and widely diffused of all chemical agencies, to wit, the atmosphere. Even in the Middle Ages many skillful experiments came to naught and many brilliant discoveries were nipped in the bud by the failure to take account of the atmosphere or its chief constituent. Even in modern times, after oxygen had been actually discovered, very little attention was paid to it for more than a century; its place was taken by the absurd fiction of phlogiston with its "negative weight." But at last Lavoisier brought into full view the long neglected factor—the omnipresent oxygen; the mythical phlogiston was forgotten, and chemistry became a true science.

(5) The history of biology is another crucial test of my thesis. In the seventeenth century, Leuwenhoek with his crude magnifying glasses made animalculæ visible. Thus the very units of life were laid bare to human inspection. And yet for almost two hundred years little attention was paid to this new revelation. A few years ago, however, Pasteur and others began to seriously study these neglected factors in the

process of life. The swift result has been an almost complete transformation of both biology and medicine. One of the most eminent of biologists tells us that only as inquiry has turned from the highest organisms to study in the lowest the process of life in the concrete has biology in theory and practice made much progress.

Such, then, is my proof that scientific induction is, primarily, a search for the essential factors in a causal process. Note further, that logicians in treating of induction have been accustomed to select arbitrarily out of the immensity of scientific research a few special instances that happen to suit their theories. But my proof has been drawn, not from selected fragments, but from the whole — from the entire course of scientific development. Each science has been shown to owe its origin and growth to the unveiling of some deep-hidden factor or factors essential to the perfection of that science.

SECTION IV. DEDUCTION

The type of deduction is geometry. A geometric demonstration is the linking together of many inductions, each so simple that its validity is assured at a glance. When, *e. g.*, a straight line is drawn to a point upon another line, you recognize that the sum of the two angles thus

formed will be equal to two right angles, not only in this particular case, but universally. For you see that any imaginable change in the position or direction of the two lines would leave the sum of the two angles unaltered; what was taken from the one would be added to the other.

It is this swift, almost unconscious transition from the particular to the universal that forms the essence — the very soul and life — of a geometric demonstration. The rest is a mere task of construction, an ingenious fitting together of many inductions until you attain the desired result. But without this incessant transformation of each particular inference into a universal one, your proof would be valid only for the one little figure given in the diagram.

Especially the final demonstrations in geometry, dependent as they are for their proof upon many preceding ones, are made up of hundreds of minute inductions, as an organism is made up of living cells.

Concerning the syllogism little need be said. The conclusion is but the abbreviated union of two premises both of which are of inductive origin. All the really difficult and valuable work of syllogistic reasoning lies in the formation and verifying of the two premises; the putting of them together in the shape of a syllo-

gism is almost as much a mechanical task as the nailing together of two boards.

But it may be objected that if geometry is the type of deduction, then there is at least one form of thinking that does not consist in a relating of cause and effect. For mathematical science deals only with the eternal and immutable, and therefore can have nothing to do with the changes of causality. But that, I think, is a very great error. In the conception of a right-angled triangle, for instance, there is the possibility of an infinite host of changes in the length of the two sides. And is it not geometry's task to tell exactly what change in the length of the hypotenuse will be caused by any one of these possible changes in the sides?

Deduction, then, forms no exception to my law that all thinking is a relating of cause and effect.

SECTION V. SPACE

Another proof of my thesis is that it explains the perplexities involved in the idea of space. For these perplexities vanish when we think of space as the nature of thought demands — that is, in terms of cause and effect.

The whole difficulty seems to have focalized upon an alleged antagonism between perceptual and conceptual space as contradictory of each

other. Kant, in his "Critique of Judgment" first suggested this opposition; and others have since laid a much greater stress upon it. But it is, I think, all a delusion. What has been erroneously regarded as a distinction between conceived and perceived space is really *a distinction between space and the spatial relations of things*. And the two so far from being antagonistic or contradictory to each other are really related as cause and effect.

Mark that I do not say that space is the sole or entire cause of the spatial relations of things such as distance, direction, etc. The cause is complex. Unchanging space is one indispensable factor in the production of spatial relations; perceptible things are another.

Do you object that space is inactive and therefore cannot be a factor in causal processes? Lotze especially insisted upon this as his main reason for denying the reality of space; the essence of anything, he argued, consists in its behavior, what it does; and since space does nothing, it is nothing. But a distinguished disciple of Lotze provides me with an all-sufficient answer to that. He says: "A medium or instrument may be perfect just in proportion as it is *inert*, neither increasing nor diminishing, nor in any way modifying what is transmitted or effected through it."¹¹

¹¹ Ward: *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, II, p. 240.

But there is another perplexity. How do we know that space is absolutely continuous, indivisible into parts? We cannot perceive — see with our eyes or feel with our fingers — that there are no crevices or holes in it. Nor can we appeal to common sense. For common sense, although more truthful than the academic conceit of wisdom which scorns it, is yet not infallible. The true answer, I think, is this. Paramount among spatial relations are those of distance or the separateness of things. But what is meant by this separateness of things is that there is space between them. If there is no space between them they are not separate. Therefore it is absurd to think of space itself as divisible into parts. For in order that the parts should be separate *there would have to be space between them*, and consequently no separation of the parts. Or, to put it more simply: if space could be divided, what then would separate the parts?

But on the other hand, the spatial relations of things are perceptibly divisible. The reason is that spatial relations are effects of space and things combined; and as thus partially produced by things they derive from them their characteristic of divisibility. But philosophers have transferred this divisibility to space itself, to which it cannot possibly belong.

Again, Kant presents it as one of the main

difficulties in the space question that space and spatial properties of things although so closely united are yet very different. How could it be otherwise? For space, as we have now seen, is related to these spatial properties as a partial cause to its effects. And the crowning mark of every causal relation is that it at once differentiates the cause from the effect and yet unites them by the firmest of all bonds.

There is no room here to discuss some minor difficulties, but enough has been said, I think, to show that to think clearly and consistently about spatial relations, we must think of them as effects conjointly caused by space and things.

SECTION VI. TIME

The time-problem furnishes another proof that thinking is, fundamentally, a relating of cause and effect. It will be shown that time is not a mere sum of parts or so-called periods of time. On the contrary, time is a partial cause, the periods are its effects. And it is the failure to thus distinguish between the cause and its effects — between time and temporal relations — that has given rise to the enigmas and seeming contradictions that have so perplexed philosophy.

(1) Consider the chief perplexity of all, that concerning past, present and future. The

present, it is said, has no duration; make it as short as you can, it is still capable of being divided into a before and after — a past and a future; the present is but the plane which without thickness separates the other two. So far as duration is concerned, the present is zero; but the past has ceased to exist and the future is not yet. Time, therefore, is but the sum of three zeros or non-existents.

I answer that time is one and indivisible. The proof thereof, like the proof of the indivisibility of space, lies in the simple question: If time can be divided into parts, what is it that separates the parts? Certainly the division could not be either space or things. Imagine two parts of time, one on one side, the other on the other side of a spatial point or line! Nor could the division be another part of time; for then there would be no separation, but continuous, indivisible duration.

(2) But are temporal relations, then, minutes, days, years, etc., merely subjective,—fictions of the mind? By no means. Temporal relations are the products of enduring things conjoined with eternal, indivisible time. The relations or periods are plainly given in immediate experience. So are the enduring things. Time as one, limitless, indivisible, is indeed an inference; but in thus inferring, thought adds nothing merely subjective or illusory. It sim-

ply interprets the given in terms of cause and effect.

(3) But it is impossible, you urge, that two factors so different as time and material things should co-operate in the same causal process. Precisely the same objection might be urged against my theory of space; but for brevity's sake, I have deferred noticing it until now. And I now answer that this parallelistic assumption is sheer nonsense. It is the very essence of all causal processes that factors of the utmost diversity should combine in one complex interaction. And the greater the diversity, the vaster the results achieved. Even the parallelist admits that the factors may differ in quantity. Why not, then, in quality?

(4) A more plausible objection may be urged that my theory of time leaves it vague and undefined, a sort of unknowable cause, after the style of the Kantian "thing in itself." But causes, as we have seen, can be known only through their effects; and conversely, effects through their causes. Hence time is the best known of all objects; for it is linked with a vaster range of effects. Space is a cause only within the physical realm; time in both the physical and psychic realms. Furthermore, time can be proved to be indivisible and infinite. Surely, then, it is very far from being unknowable.

(5) But what is the proof, it may be asked, of time's infinitude? I answer, if time is finite it must be limited by something. But nothing can exist without time to exist in. Therefore whatever puts an end to time would put an end to itself, and so there would be no limit.

(6) Another objection to time's reality is its unpicturability. "As has often been pointed out, all our representations of time are images borrowed from space, and all alike contain contradictions of the time idea. We think of it as an endless straight line, but the conception fails to fit; for the points of such a line co-exist, while of the time-line only the present point exists." Recently, Bergson has made this ancient dilemma the corner-stone of a new philosophy just now commanding much attention. Time as conceived by the mere intellect, he argues, is virtually identical with space. I answer that time and space do indeed agree in this, *that they both are unpicturable*. We can picture or form a memory-image only of what has been perceived. Now, neither space nor time are perceived, but thought infers them from the spatial and temporal relations that are perceived. But, I repeat, in thus inferring, thought adds nothing illusory: it simply interprets the given in terms of cause and effect. And thus it discovers, without the aid of any intuition, that pure space and pure time must

be essentially different. For since the effects, *e. g.*, distances and hours, are manifestly different, their causes, space and time, must be essentially different. In fine, the brilliant imagination of Bergson has over-reached itself. No wealth of metaphors will enable him to picture what is manifestly unpicturable.

(7) But there still remains one possible objection of great importance. It may be urged that throughout the chapter I have misconstrued the nature of causation, that it really means nothing more than uniform sequence. But against that criticism the present section provides an impregnable defense. For it shows that sequence, so far from being a substitute for causation, *is itself absolutely inexplicable unless it is interpreted in terms of cause and effect.*

We have now examined all the grand divisions of thinking — perceptive judgment, conception, induction, deduction, affirmation of space and of time. And we have found them all reducible to one essential function, to wit, the interpretation of the given in terms of cause and effect.

(1) Thus Hume's famous problem which, according to Höffding, "Kant failed to solve and is indeed insoluble," has finally been solved. Hume asserted that causation was only a regu-

lar succession of phenomena in space and time. But I have proved that each word in his definition is, in its essence, a declaration of causality. Eliminate causation and each word would lose all its meaning. Thus in the very act of denying causality, Hume is forced to affirm it over and over again.

(2) My argument is, in fact, a *reductio ad absurdum* in the completest form imaginable. The geometer proves his theorem by showing that its denial would involve the denial of some universally accepted principle. My theorem is proved by showing that its denial would invalidate all judgments, efface all distinctions, in fine, would involve the utter extinction of thought.

(3) And even if you are willing to accept this utter invalidity of all thinking, there is still an answer for you. For if all our judgments are false, then this particular judgment, to wit, that all our judgments are false, must be as false as all the rest.

CHAPTER II

THE PERFECT CAUSE

SECTION I. THE AMBIGUITY OF CAUSATION

As promised at the beginning of Chapter I, we have now to consider the ambiguities that seem to infest the term "cause" as commonly used. And first of all, let us remember, what is so often forgotten, that no effect is the product solely of a single cause, but of a complex of many co-operating causes. Each one of these factors, then, is but an incomplete or partial cause. Even the sum of them all would not be a complete cause, for their conjunction and co-operation would still have to be accounted for.

It is folly, then, to conceive the imperfect and partial as if they were complete causes, and then bemoan the ambiguity of causation. To comprehend any concept aright *we must conceive it in its perfected type*. If it appears also in imperfect forms, we can descend to these by pointing out the defects which distinguish them from the perfect type. But the course can never be reversed. The deficiencies of the

lower will give no insight into the perfection of the higher. A river can rise no higher than its source. There are, then, not different kinds *but only different degrees of perfection in causality*. At the summit of the scale we find the perfect type, the complete, self-sufficient Cause, the chief characteristics of which are to be described and proved in this chapter. Thence there is a continuous declension into lower degrees or imperfect types. The highest of these known to us is the causality of the human spirit, akin to that of God, but limited to action upon its own body; its freedom hampered by the instincts of the flesh; its rationality restricted by the limitations of sense. Next below comes the organic world, wherein causality has shrunk to a self-determination which Hegel and others have confounded with true human freedom, and where rationality has faded away into a merely automatic association of similarities. Then comes the inorganic world, ruled by uniform but inscrutable forces.

In fine, the present philosophic bewilderment is largely due to beginning the study of causation *at the wrong end*. How can we expect to learn the real nature of anything, if we confine our study of it to its imperfections, its most imperfect and obscurest types? More than two thousand years ago, Aristotle saw the folly of such a method as that. He said: "By the

concept of the straight we discover both the straight and the crooked; the rule is the test of both, while the crooked is not a test either of itself or the straight." That precisely outlines the method I shall follow. To know the human soul we must start from some insight into the nature of a Perfect Cause. Nothing can be comprehended if it is conceived only in its most imperfect types. The crooked is not a test either of itself or the straight.

SECTION II. INFINITUDE

We have proved that thought cannot deny the reality of causation without destroying itself. The question now before us is simply this: What are the main characteristics of a perfect or complete and self-sufficient cause? I answer, first, that one essential of such a cause is infinitude. For whatever is finite is limited by something else, and therefore must be, to that extent, an effect; it may also be a partial cause or factor in a causal process, but never a complete, self-sufficient cause. Now this proof, though given in a few words, seems clear and incontrovertable. But there are objections to be met.

First, Sir William Hamilton and others insist that "The Infinite" is a merely negative and therefore an inconceivable and unknowable notion. And that is true enough so far as

“The Infinite” is concerned; nothing could be more utterly blank and void than that. But substitute for this senseless abstraction the notion of *The Infinite Cause*, and how great is the change! For causality is not abstract, but concrete and positive — the one reality which all true thinking is bent upon discovering. And the adjective “infinite” added to it, instead of negating it, expands it; makes it more glorious and sublime.

The second objection, as McTaggart puts it, is: “If God is omnipotent, why could He not attain his ends without the use of any intervening means?”¹

I answer that so far as God himself was concerned, He had no need of these intermediaries. For the infinite has need of nothing. But one of his ends manifestly was the creation of finite beings able to think and to advance in knowledge. But such knowledge would be impossible in a universe where there were no uniform processes, no means of linking together the innumerable parts into a consistent whole.

SECTION III. UNITY

The second elemental feature of a complete or self-sufficient cause is Unity. We perceive in Nature a vast variety of causal processes

¹ *Some Dogmas of Religion*, p. 201.

each containing many factors. But the greater the multiplicity of these co-operating factors, the greater the demand for some self-sufficient cause binding the many factors into one process, and all processes into one cosmic system. And here we are at once confronted by that age-long dispute concerning "The One and the Many," which Prof. Ward avers is to be the problem of the present century. But what was said, in the previous section, concerning "The Infinite" applies here also. "The One and the Many" interpreted as the nature of thought demands — in terms of cause and effect — becomes the clear, consistent conception, -One Cause of Many Effects. Before that view the old perplexities vanish. For instance, Ward says that "to the One so transcendently different from all that we know, none of our concepts are applicable." On the contrary, the supreme concept which, dome-like, over-arches all human thinking, namely, that of the Perfect Cause, is the concept which clearly and fully expresses the meaning of "The One," properly understood.

Or again, Höffding argues that "our concept of cause is a concept of plurality of conditions, so that a cause cannot be an absolute unity." But that annuls all causality by reducing it to an endless series of effects which

have no cause. Indeed, Höffding admits this: both in his "History of Philosophy" and his "Philosophy of Religion" he declares that "we shall never be able to solve Hume's problem as to the validity of the principle of causation."

And this effacement of causality is also the tap-root of Hegelianism. Bradley, *e. g.*, argues at great length that all phases of finite being are false appearances, because they involve the self-contradiction of unity and diversity. But when this unity and diversity is interpreted causally — that is, as one cause of many effects — the contradiction vanishes. For the essence of the causal relation is to differentiate and at the same time unite by the firmest of bonds.

The causal processes of Nature are complexes of many factors. And each one of these factors is but an imperfect cause performing a task that by itself is absolutely inexplicable. Even Höffding concedes that "strictly speaking, not a single event has been entirely explained." And this invariable co-operation of countless myriads of unconscious factors can never be made intelligible until we rise to the conception of that One Perfect Cause that planned, established and maintains it all.

Such then is the simple proof of unity:
(1) Without a perfect or complete cause there

would be no causation at all; but that is impossible. (2) To split up this one, perfect cause into many imperfect ones, is to destroy it.

From the earliest ages, all unspoiled intelligence has had a glimpse of this great truth. Thousands of years ago, the Egyptians proclaimed it in their hymn to Amon-Ra: "The one, Maker of all that is; the only One, the Maker of Existence."

SECTION IV. FREEDOM AND RATIONALITY

The third characteristic of a perfect or self-sufficient cause is freedom. That, of course, is tautological. Still it must not be forgotten; for it will prove of great value to us when we come to treat of human freedom.

The fourth characteristic is rationality. My proof here consists largely in rectifying the old argument from design. The fault of the old argument was that it attempted too much. From the order and conformity to aims exhibited in the world, it sought to prove the existence of an omnipotent God. But Kant found it very easy to show that "this argument is utterly insufficient for the task before us — a demonstration of the existence of an all-sufficient being."² My course, however, has been very different. First it was proved that causa-

² *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 466, 467.

tion was real, and that this involved the reality of a perfect or complete cause — not an infinite regress of incomplete causes. Then it was shown that this perfect cause must be infinite and one. And now I seek to show from the order and harmony of Nature that this cause must also be rational. *The conclusion thus narrowed down to this special point becomes almost a truism:* the objections which discredited the old argument lose all their force.

But it may be said that evolutionary science contradicts my view. Not a perfect cause, infinite, one and rational, but Natural Selection has built up the universe. I answer that the theory of evolution, instead of contradicting my view, illumines and corroborates it. For it reveals the methods, the intermediate agencies employed by the Infinite Cause in the development of the universe. Remember that Natural Selection was never considered by Darwin to be the sole factor in evolution. As that high authority, Yves Delage, declares: "Darwin's successors exaggerated (as scientists are apt to exaggerate every new theory) the rôle played by selection."³ This exaggeration is much to be deplored. It has imparted a sinister aspect to the theory of evolution. It has made it look as if cruelty, pain and death were the only

³ Delage and Goldsmith: *Theories of Evolution*, pp. 60, 61.

actors in the glorious drama of the world's development.

Conversely, my doctrine illumines the theory of evolution. Recall, for instance, Spencer's splendid attempt to construct a philosophy of the evolutionary process. He finds that the process has three essential characteristics: (1) Integration, (2) Differentiation and (3) a determination which presupposes a definite harmony between (1) and (2). But Höffding, although in sympathy with Spencer, points out that *proof of this third characteristic is lacking*. "It is not a mere accident," he says, "that Spencer was unable to establish this principle. It is impossible to furnish any guarantee for the harmony of Integration and Differentiation. . . . Spencer therefore was unable to furnish a proof of harmonious evolution."

But this harmony for which both Spencer and Höffding sought in vain I have certainly discovered. For, as I have already shown, the essence of every causal process is to, at once, *differentiate* cause from effect and yet *integrate* or unite them by the firmest of bonds.

SECTION V. SELF-LIMITATION

The supreme characteristic of a perfect or self-sufficient cause is love or self-limitation for the sake of others.

Whatever acts only to supply some want or need of its own cannot be a perfect or self-sufficient cause. For that which was lacking or needed would be an alien element and the ultimate cause of the action. But an infinite being has need of nothing; therefore, if it acts at all, causes any change or effect, it must act for the sake of others. The failure to see this plain, simple and yet supremely significant truth was the fatal error in Spinoza's philosophy. He denied the existence of any final causes, any plan or purpose in the divine activity; "for, if God acts for an end, it must needs be that God desires something which he lacks, and if so, *de facto* is imperfect." And through this failure, Spinoza's God dwindled into mere substance, without intelligence, will or personality of any kind.

But leaving these old philosophies to rest quietly in their sepulchres, let us go on to more vital questions. And first of all: How is it possible to think of God as thus limiting Himself without annulling His infinitude? My answer is, by thinking of Him, not in terms of space, but in terms of causality. Man is a little creature, but he does not diminish himself by deeds of self-limitation or sacrifice for the sake of others. Nor does self-sacrifice impair, but rather ennoble even the infinitude of God.

But these are only preliminaries. Let us hasten to the fundamental question — the one great perplexity that has wrought more havoc in human thought and life than all others combined — the problem of evil. If God loves mankind, why does he permit so much evil to exist in the world? The drift of recent thought seems to be towards solving this by assuming that God is finite, limited in power. Thus Dr. Rashdall, who has grown famous as an expounder of this theory of God's finiteness, says: "That evil is a means to the greatest attainable good is a proposition which is only maintainable upon the hypothesis — that there is in the ultimate nature of things — that is to say, in the ultimate nature of God — an inherent reason why greater good should not be attainable. But the dilemma forces itself upon us that the explanation must be sought either in such a moral limitation (a defect of goodness) or in some other kind which may be best described as a limitation of Power."⁴ And he adopts the last hypothesis, "the union in one and the same Being of absolute Goodness with limited Power."⁵

Now it seems to me that the true key to the problem can be expressed by interpolating three words between the first two in that quotation.

⁴ *Theory of Good and Evil*, II, pp. 287, 288.

⁵ *Ibid*, II, p. 341.

I would make it read that, not evil, but the *possibility* of evil is a means to the greatest attainable good. The change is verbally slight, but it is of vast significance. To say that evil is a means to the greatest good is to extirpate morality. It makes the vilest wretch as true a servant of God as the saint. But to say that the possibility of evil is a means to the greatest good is little more than a truism. For the very essence of moral action lies in the fact that it is possible and even easier to do the opposite or wrongful act. Doubtless, God could have made it impossible for man, as He has made it impossible for animals, flowers, stones, etc., to do wrong. But to have done so would not show any increase of power on his part. On the contrary, it would prove a defect in his goodness; in fact, it would be, so far as finite beings are concerned, an abolition of all goodness in the ethical sense of the term.

Note further that Rashdall is an eager determinist, devoting many pages to exploiting that doctrine. Now, the determinist point of view relieves man of all real responsibility for his wrong-doing and thrusts it back finally upon his Maker; and thus it becomes very easy to show that the great flood of evil over-spreading the earth proves God's finiteness both in goodness and in power. But this determinist's view will be further considered when we come to

our main theme — the proof of the soul's existence. For the present it is enough to see that a doctrine can hardly be true which leads to two such monster paradoxes as the denial of man's responsibility and God's infinitude.

My discussion of the problem of evil has necessarily been brief; too much so, perhaps, to be altogether satisfactory. But it has been made plain, I think, that the perplexity of this problem is largely due to the attempt to show that evil is but a means to the good. Instead of that I have shown that the mere possibility of evil is not itself an evil. On the contrary, it is freedom — God's noblest gift to man, one bringing us into such close kinship with him that we may rightly be called his children. Do you say that He might have endowed us with freedom and yet prevented all wrong-doing — that is, made evil at once possible and impossible? McTaggart does indeed urge that omnipotence could defy the law of contradiction. But such a saying is but a series of sounds absolutely bereft of meaning.

SECTION VI. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

In these two chapters we have finally reached a full demonstration of God's existence. Note, however, that this proof is in no wise the famous "ontological argument" which Kant is said to have demolished. Really it had been

demolished nearly five hundred years before Kant's day, by St. Thomas Aquinas, who rejected it on the ground that it improperly passed from the ideal to the real order. So did the great majority of the Scholastics; and we are told that the Neo-Scholastics of to-day also "regard the ontological proof as worthless." But this proof, rejected by the Middle Ages, Descartes restored in a still more irrational form. And even after Kant had demolished it again, Hegel revived it once more. But Hegel's God or Absolute is merely the "Totality" of the existent, so that his ontological proof seems to reduce itself to the tautology that whatever exists exists.

But my demonstration is the polar opposite of all this. It does not rest upon the curious assumption that because we have the idea of a perfect being, therefore such a being must exist. But first it was proved inductively, by a study of every form of thought, that the sole essential function of all thinking was to affirm causation — that is, to interpret the given in terms of cause and effect. If causation, then, is not real, all thinking must be false. Therefore it is impossible for thought to deny the reality of causation; for in the very attempt to do so, it destroys itself. Our second step was to show that there must be a perfect or self-sufficient cause, for to deny that

was to virtually cancel causality by reducing it to an endless regress of effects which have no real cause. The existence of a perfect self-sufficient cause having been proved, it was shown that such a being must have the attributes of infinitude, oneness, rationality and love. And this being, thus proved to be actually existent and endowed with these attributes, is the theistic God.

CHAPTER III

THE UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

SECTION I. THE IDEALISTIC PSEUDO-PROOF

So far we have been necessarily occupied in pioneer work; for the pathway to rational belief in the soul is beset by many obstacles. One great difficulty that has hindered many from recognizing their own souls is that we are all more or less slaves of our senses. We are so accustomed to perceiving things in their spatial relations — shape, size, position, etc.— that we demand that souls should exhibit themselves in such relations. Even the immortal Descartes searched in the brain for the place where the soul was located. And Kant rejected the soul outright, because it did not appear as a substance.

But we have now seen that the causal category is the ultimate all-embracing one to which all the minor categories must be subordinated. Therefore, to comprehend the spiritual we must interpret it in terms of cause and effect. The moment we try to describe it in spatial terms — location, shape, substance, etc.— we are lost babes in the wood.

It may be well to mention another method of obscuring the soul's reality, much in vogue even among the staunch, orthodox philosophers of the Scottish school of common sense and realism. The stream or series of conscious states, they tell us, is manifest; but the soul itself is merely suggested. Thus Reid says: Our sensations and thoughts do also suggest the notion of a mind and the belief of its existence. Dugald Stewart also declares the soul's existence a mere suggestion.¹ Sir William Hamilton says: "There is only possible a deduced, relative and secondary knowledge of self." Dr. Wayland is still more explicit: "All that we are able to affirm of it (the mind) is something which perceives, reflects and wills; but what that something is, we know not."

All that sounds very much like a surrender to the enemy of souls. Those who were regarded as staunch champions of spiritualism lay down their arms and consign souls to the dark lists of the Unknowable.

And the defection was entirely needless. For from what we have proved to be the fundamental law of all thinking is derived the evident corollary, that *causes cannot be known apart from their effects, and conversely, effects cannot be known apart from their causes*. To say, then, as the writers quoted do, that we

¹ Porter: *Intellectual Science*, pp. 69, 70.

know the soul only through its activities is not an altogether false assertion. But it is only a half-truth and therefore a fatally one-sided, mutilated and misleading view. For it keeps out of sight the complementary truth that our psychic activities are also unknowable apart from the unitary, abiding self that produces them. And no other falsehoods are quite so deceptive as those that tell one-half of the truth, and forget to tell the other half.

But what has done more than all else to undermine belief in God and the soul is the pseudo-proof offered by idealism. It needs but a glance, for it is very simple. It consists in assuming that the human body, like all other material things, is an illusion; but I certainly exist, therefore I am a soul. In fact, the origin and the prestige of idealism, both in ancient India and in modern Europe, are due mainly to this very cheap and easy proof which is offered for the existence of God and the human soul.

But idealism has failed ignominiously to keep the promise upon which its prestige rested. Kant, for instance, boasted that he had "destroyed knowledge in order to make room for faith." But faith, if it is to be any more than driveling superstition, must be "according to knowledge"; and so Kant, in destroying knowl-

edge, destroyed true faith. And Hegel's admirers now-a-days will hardly dispute that his "Absolute" is but a travesty upon the theistic conception of God. McTaggart admits it openly and joyously. Calkins says: "It must be admitted he nowhere outlines the argument (for the individuality of God). To the present writer this neglect seems the greatest and most inexplicable defect of Hegel's logic."² And concerning the human soul Hegel himself says: "The truth is that there is only one reason, one mind, and that the mind as finite has no existence."

Let us briefly consider, then, this idealism which promises so much and performs so little. It is based, I think, upon two fundamental errors. The first error is its claim that we have immediate knowledge only of our sensations and not of objects perceived. But that seems to me the most obvious and inexcusable of all fallacies. To know anything we must know some, at least, of its attributes. What, then, are the attributes by which one sensation is discriminated from another? Is it not evident that they are attributes not of the sensations themselves, but of the objects perceived? Is the sensation of a round object itself circular? Is the sensation of a mountain any taller than the sensation of an ant-hill? Is the sensation of a red

² *Persistent Problems of Philosophy*, p. 380.

object, itself painted red? Plainly the sensations, insofar as psychical, have no discernible attributes of their own by which they can be known.

For more than a quarter of a century I have been insisting upon this patent truth;³ and in that time I have found but two writers of note coinciding with me. Brentano says: "We find no contrasts between presentations except those of the objects to which presentations refer." And recently that well-known idealist, Joachim, has written a paper in which he argues at great length that no mind can know its own psychical processes. "We are in fact," he says, "committed to an infinite pursuit of that which, by the very terms of its conception, cannot be caught or apprehended and refuses to stand over against us as an object of our awareness. At every step of our pursuit, the 'psychical process'—the process of apprehending—eludes us and leaves us in possession of an object of apprehension."⁴ But curiously enough, he does not seem to see that this view annihilates idealism. For the gist of idealism is that the mind knows only its own psychic processes and therefore that nothing else can be known to really exist.

The second idealistic error is a false view

³ *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, Oct. 1886.

⁴ *Mind*, N. S., Vol. XVIII, p. 70.

of illusions. It regards them as the product of certain tendencies inherent in the constitution of human thought. Kant found as many as fourteen of these constitutional tendencies all leading to false appearances. But manifestly false appearances spring, not from the constitution of thought, but from the *lack* of thought and too much trust in mere sense. An illusion is simply the ascription of a given effect to a wrong cause. It is the mission of thought not to produce but to dispell illusions. Once, sunset, *e.g.*, was deemed to be caused by the sun's motions; hard thinking revealed the true cause. Kant compared himself with Copernicus. In fact, they were antipodes in thinking. If Copernicus had explained sunrise as due to one of the fourteen Kantian a-priorities — false but valid for all — mankind would still be back in the Dark Ages.

And Hegel carried the Kantian irrationalism a notch higher. For him everything was not merely phenomenal, but also self-contradictory. Nevertheless, one ought to look kindly upon idealism. It has been, in philosophy, very much like what "make-believe" is in child-life. No one scorns the little girl for watching over her doll so tenderly; she is developing her imagination and the holy instinct of motherhood. Just so the idealists' paradoxes must not be taken too seriously or judged too harshly; they be-

gan in an instinctive craving for the knowledge of God and the soul. Their fault is that they have not achieved their purpose. They have helped to destroy what they promised to promote.

SECTION II. LOTZE'S ARGUMENT

Among the few recent idealists who have defended the belief in souls, Lotze stands foremost. He presents three proofs commonly adduced for that belief. The first, he says, "that appeal to *freedom* which is said to characterize mental life . . . has no weight." The second is the entire *incompatibility* of all inner processes — sensations, ideas, etc.— with motion in space, figure, position, etc. To that proof he assigns only a very slight weight: "It would be going too far to assert that the two principles belong to two different sorts of substance."⁵ The third reason is the unity of consciousness. That, he says, "is the unassailable ground on which the conviction of the soul's independence can securely rest."

But it seems to me that Lotze's estimate of the three proofs must be exactly reversed. The first and the second proofs are far stronger than the third. Nor have I ever been able to find any cogency even in his argument for the unity of consciousness. And near the close of

⁵ *Metaphysics*, § 241.

the chapter he clearly discloses the real basis of his belief in the soul. He there says: "Lastly, in our present metaphysical discussion we need not have entered upon these objections at all. . . . Everything we supposed ourselves to know of matter as an obvious and independent existence has long since dissolved in the conviction that matter itself . . . is nothing but an appearance to our perceptions."⁶ In fine, his whole argument tapers down into the idealistic pseudo-proof: our bodies are illusions, therefore our souls exist.

My purpose here has been, not to disparage Lotze — a prince among thinkers — but to show how thin and weak has been the evidence heretofore offered for the soul's existence. But from our present vantage-ground I hope to reach a higher level of proof. In this chapter I shall try to recast the argument for the unity of consciousness. The other two proofs, the crowning and conclusive ones, will be given in the two following chapters.

SECTION III. THE TRUE UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Note first of all that unity is the most ambiguous of terms. There is a spatial unity, a contiguity of atoms that to sense seem as one; also a unity of resemblance; and many others.

⁶ *Op. cit.* § 248.

But as we have seen, these unities are defective and deceptive, unless they are subordinated under the supreme category — the unity of cause and effect. And under that category the unity of consciousness must be conceived. It is not a spatial unity, like that of a heap of sand. Nor a unity of resemblance; for the elements of consciousness are exceedingly diverse. The flux of mental phenomena must be conceived as myriads of evanescent *effects*; and yet as united by a cause which is aware of them all, gives them varying degrees of attention, and out of them constructs an organized and lasting experience.

Through ignoring this distinction, philosophy has been unable to prove the unity of consciousness. Lotze's plea, *e.g.*, is substantially this: whatever discerns the likeness or unlikeness of things must be a unit.⁷ But even plants appear to discriminate between different soils and foods. And chemical elements seem to know their affinities. Why, then, should not a human body without a soul be able to do what plants and gases can do?

Others, like Prof. Strong, concede that the unity of consciousness has not yet been proved; "all the difficulty is on the score of unity."⁸ He promises to overcome the difficulty in a

⁷ *Op. cit.* 241.

⁸ *Why the Mind has a Body*, last page.

future book. But the vast series of psychic phenomena that go flashing through a human life can be unified only in the way I have described.

But it will be objected that even if the unity of consciousness can thus be verified and explained, that does not prove the existence of the soul. The unifying may be the work of the brain. In answer thereto I begin by quoting from a high authority, this: "The incessant labors of a multitude of workers have revealed the fact that not only the spinal cord but the whole of the brain is built up on the reflex plan. There is even good reason to believe, though here we are on less firm ground, that all the processes of the brain, even those that accompany the most abstruse thought, conform to the same fundamental reflex type."⁹ The main — we will not say the sole — function of the brain is to promote reflex action. That function is of priceless value. If all the intricate activities needful for the maintenance of life had to be worked out *consciously* by the mind there would be no time or energy left for the noble activities of thought or reason. Man would be a mere animal ruled by blind instinct.

But mark now that this reflex action is a movement opposite to that of thought — a movement towards blind instinct and the me-

⁹ McDougall: *Body and Mind*, p. 107.

chanical. It is absurd, then, to account for the superiority of man over the brutes, as due to his having a slightly larger brain. For the larger the brain, the greater this automatism, this conversion of the conscious into the unconscious — the very negation of thought.

CHAPTER IV

CONFLICT OF SENSE AND REASON

The second proof, incompatibility, it will be remembered, Lotze regarded as having but little weight. When rightly understood, however, it becomes the supreme proof, unanswerable and conclusive.

Modern philosophy has been much perplexed by that aspect of contradiction which seems everywhere to pervade the universe. Kant ascribed it to some queer twist in all human minds which prevented them from seeing things as they really are. Hegel ascribed it to some strange perversity in the things themselves. Neither of these views seems at all satisfactory; and I therefore propound another as follows: This universal aspect of contradiction is due to *the dual nature of man — to the constant conflict of the senses and the soul.*

To prove this, let us briefly survey the chief categories of human knowledge. It will not take long, for these antitheses are so sharp and clear as to be evident at a glance when rightly presented. And it will be found in each case

that the two antithetic terms are not merely different from each other. They are polar opposites; they tend in contrary directions. Therefore in each case the two antithetic terms must be the products of different agencies. No one thing can move simultaneously in opposite directions. Hence throughout all human experiences, two agencies must be at work; on the one hand, the animal organism producing our sensations; on the other, a soul that thinks or reasons.

SECTION I. LIST OF ANTITHESES

(1) *Reason*. Here we have contradiction in its widest and clearest type. For it is a mere truism to say that Reason discloses hidden facts that are *contradicted* by the testimony of the senses.

(2) *Causation*. Hume's famous disproof of causality rests almost solely upon the fact that a causal nexus is imperceptible to the senses. To that no answer has ever been made either by Kant or his successors. But I have shown that to deny causality is to make all thinking impossible. In other words, the very essence, the supreme purpose of all true thinking, is *to reveal the unseen*. Here, then, we have another antithesis of sublime import. The animal senses show us the visible; but the thinking soul reveals the invisible.

(3) *Relations*. The besetting sin of philosophers is, notoriously, their habit of hypostasising abstractions. That plainly is an outcome of the strife between sense and reason. Instinctively thinkers are beguiled into putting the spiritual in sensuous forms. A glaring instance thereof is afforded by Bradley's brilliant book, "Appearance and Reality." The corner-stone of that work is its denial of relations. "A relational way of thought," we are told, "any one that moves by the machinery of terms and relations, must give appearance and not truth." And his proof, as others before me have pointed out, consists in conceiving a relation as a thing — an iron bar, as it were, which seeks but everlastingly fails to get hooked on to its two terms. Surely sense there won a silly triumph over reason.

(4) *Conception*. Here again a contradiction emerges over which a wordy warfare has been waged for at least two thousand years. On the one hand, our senses, like those of other animals, disclose only the individual and isolated; on the other hand, Reason reveals, as I have shown,¹ those causal processes which make the reality of Natural Kinds indubitable. The problem can never be adequately solved except by recognizing the duality of human nature.

(5) *Analysis and Synthesis*. Thinking, the

¹ Chapter I, Section 2, p. 8.

Hegelians say, is a combining of two contradictory functions; it is at once analytic and synthetic; that is, it at once divides and unites. Bosanquet explains this as follows: "In mechanical operations we cannot pull to pieces and put together the same thing by the same act." But "the essence of thought is to show the process in the result and exhibit each as necessary for the other."

Now Bosanquet's statement concerning the nature of thought is but a vague version of the truth formally demonstrated in the first chapter of this book, to wit, that all thinking is essentially a relating of cause and effect. But of this truth he offers no proof. With him it is a mere assumption manufactured to meet a difficulty.

Furthermore, there is no real contradiction between the analytic and the synthetic aspect of thought. They seem to be contradictory because our bondage to sense leads us to confound the mental operations of analysis and synthesis with the sensible operations of dividing and uniting a thing. In short, we have here a signal example of the conflict between sense and reason.

(6) *Similarity*. No concept is so often used even among philosophers as that of similarity or likeness. And no other is so fruitful in misunderstandings and paradoxes. On its very

face it bears the stamp of the self-contradictory. For there are no two things that are not at once *like and unlike* each other.

It is significant that Bergson, who has gained celebrity through his attempt to disparage intellect as inferior to instinct or feeling, bases his contention upon this elusive, self-contradictory relation of mere resemblance. He asserts repeatedly that "the natural function of the intellect is to bind like to unlike." He even maintained that "there is a vague and in some sort objective resemblance spread over the surface of the images themselves," and that "this similarity acts objectively like a force." That seems the climax of nonsense.

Bergson does not see that it is sense or instinct — not intellect — that is guided solely by the likeness or unlikeness of things. Thought, as the whole history of science teaches, liberates from that bondage. It transmutes, as I have shown (Chapter I, Section 2) the vague misleading relations of similarity into causal relations.

(7) *Space*. Here little need be added to what I have already said concerning perceptual and conceptual space.² The former, which gives us the spatial relations between sensible things — distances, directions, etc. — is the pure product of sensation; animals recognise

² Chapter I, Section 5.

them as clearly as man does, often more so. But man, endowed with reason, recognises also conceptual space — that is, a space which is not, as spatial relations are, *many, finite, divisible*, but on the contrary, absolutely *one, infinite and indivisible*. Unmistakably we have here an enormous contrast — contradiction multiplied three-fold. And yet these more than polar opposites constantly present themselves in all human experience. Can their co-existence be explained except as the products of two diametrically different agencies, animal sense and the thinking soul?

(8) *Time*. The same argument evidently applies to the contrariety shown in our first chapter between temporal relations or periods — such as hours, days, years, etc.—and time as a whole. The temporal periods are many, finite, and divisible. But time itself is one, infinite and indivisible. Here, then, is another point-blank contradiction between what sense perceives and reason discovers.

(9) *Time and Space*. But common to both of these there is another contradiction which has wrought more perplexity, dispute, and chaotic confusion in modern philosophy than all other causes combined. On the one hand, both Space and Time when contemplated by sense seem to be absolutely nothing: space possesses no sensible mark or attribute by which

it can be distinguished from pure nothing; and as for time, the present is a mere boundary line — without width — between the non-existent past and the non-existent future. It was this apparent nothingness that made it so easy for Kant to convince his disciples that space and time were mere fictions of the mind. But on the other hand, Reason teaches (as shown in Chapter I) that these two nothings are real causes upon which everything else in the universe depends for its existence. Abolish space and time, and you blot out the universe. For what exists nowhere and never, does not exist at all.

(10) *Numbers.* The arithmetical unit is the most difficult conception which primitive thought has to grasp, because it is the most antithetic to what the senses teach. For the units are absolutely alike and unchangeable; but sensible things are never quite alike and forever changing. And it is not the untutored savage alone that is embarrassed by this contrariety of reason and sense. Even the Greeks — princes in philosophy, poetry and the fine arts — seem to have been unable to clearly distinguish between numbers and things numbered.³ So imperfect was their system of notation that they had to work all difficult problems geometrically.⁴

³ Wallace: *Prolegomena Hegel's Logic*.

⁴ Ritchie: *Plato*, p. 49.

Something of this conflict lingers subtly in modern philosophy. Thus Mill argues that all numbers must be numbers of something; abstract numbers do not exist.⁵ On the contrary, James is confident that "all arithmetical propositions deal with abstract and ideal numbers exclusively."⁶

(11) *Physical Science*. We have thus examined the ten chief categories with which science deals. But it may be well to add a quotation from James concerning the sciences in general. "They are all translations of sensible experience into other forms . . . coupled with declarations that the experienced form is false and the ideal form true. . . . And the miracle of miracles, a miracle not yet exhaustively treated by any philosophy, is that the given order lends itself to the remodelling." There is no "miracle," however, but simply the natural yielding of the "night-view" given by sense to "the daylight view" given by reason.

SECTION II. ART

What has just been said concerning science applies also to art. Indeed, art was the soul's first revolt against the bondage of sense — an effort to free itself, to rise to something higher than animal life and feeling. History shows

⁵ *Logic*, Bk. II, Chap. II, Sec. 2.

⁶ *Psychology*, II, p. 655.

this priority of art to anything like scientific thought. The brutish dwellers in the Dordogne caves had somehow acquired the artistic gift; their modellings of mammoths, deer, etc., show a surprising excellence. It seems well authenticated also that in the genesis of language, poetry long preceded prose.

Unfortunately, I must here confine myself to brief mention of two or three phases of art. And first of all to that pre-eminent mark of the æsthetic spirit, The Love of Nature. Therein the conflict between sense and reason which pervades all human experience is most vividly displayed. Sense is chiefly impressed by the disagreeable aspects of Nature—storms, earthquakes and other perils. Even so artistic a race as the Greeks seem to have been devoid of any genuine love of Nature. “So far as I can recollect,” says Ruskin, “every Homeric landscape intended to be beautiful is composed of a fountain, a meadow and a shady grove.” The poet Schiller also declares that the Greeks “took no interest or heart in the details of Nature.” With the Romans it was still worse. Even the glories of Alpine scenery suggested to them no associations but those of horror and desolation. “The few attempts at landscape painting among the Greeks and Romans,” says Brunn, “never rose above a bird’s-

eye view or an insipid scenography.”⁷ But later on, when Europe had been taught that one Infinite and self-sacrificing Cause manifested Himself even in the lowliest things on earth, then the Love of Nature burst forth like the rising of the sun. Animal- and plant-life became centers of poetic interest. “The Romance of the Rose,” for example, was translated into many languages and everywhere received with extravagant delight.⁸ And not only in these grand, epical forms, but in the simple, homely songs of the common people, the same deep, mystical passion for Nature is displayed.

Gothic Architecture is another triumph of reason over sense, of the spirit over the flesh. Greek architecture was limited to the outer form: “the exterior is of a simple but majestic beauty; the interior is contracted and paltry.”⁹ But in the medieval cathedral the exterior, although grand, is but the casket holding the treasures within. The lofty aisles, the vaults interwoven like a forest, the host of attenuated columns, the dim vistas, the solemn shadows intermingling with radiant color, the circular window with its brilliant petals figuring the

⁷ Brunn: *Gesch. d. Griechischen Künstler*, II, p. 308.

⁸ Roquefort: *La Poesie Francaise*, p. 170.

⁹ Schnaase: *Gesch. d. Bild. Kunst.*, IV, p. 193.

rose of eternity, the maze of details fashioned from the flowers by the wayside — all unite to form one vast symbol of God and Nature. It is the victory of the inner over the outer, of spirit over sense.

Music, too, tells the same story. Sense gives us but a medley of noises; and the first efforts to unify this chaos created the monotonous music known to savages. Even of the Greeks it is said that "it remains to be proved that their vocal melody consisted of anything more strictly musical than intoning."¹⁰ But musical harmony is the gift of the Middle Ages to the world's art. It was first-discovered in the times of Gregory the Great. But in the age of the crusades "the art of descant was invented and the evolution of modern music was fairly under way."¹¹ From noise and monotony to modern music is surely a great triumph of soul over sense.

SECTION III. MORALITY

The contrariety between the sensuous and the ethical is so obvious that it needs but to be mentioned. Long ago it crystallized in that famous line of the poet, "*Video meliora proboque; deteriora sequor.*" Morality implies a

¹⁰ Hullah: *History of Modern Music*, p. 92.

¹¹ *Op. cit.* p. 77.

conscious refusal to do what we feel a strong desire to do — a conscious inhibition of impulses working steadily and mightily within us.

But it may be objected that this conflict of impulses does not necessarily involve a dual agency. A man may have a strong desire to slay another, but be deterred therefrom by fear of the consequences. That is true but irrelevant. For in such a divided consciousness there is no ethical element. He who refrains from murder solely through fear of being hanged is at heart a murderer.

The essence of morality, then, is self-denial. "All have sinned." The best of men have to wage perpetual war against evil desires and tendencies. And this strife cannot be accounted for by anything in the merely animal nature of man. As a competent authority has said: "The analogies between the habits of animals and the customs of the most backward natives of Australia prove so faint as to cast no light at all on any of the special developments within the moral nature of the latter."¹²

And nothing but frank recognition of man's dual nature will throw any real light upon the dark theme of human conduct. On the one side is the animal nature which, left to itself, en-

¹² Marett: *Personal Idealism*, p. 248.

genders only brutishness. On the other is the human spirit able to know the right and to battle against the wrong.

We have made a wide survey of psychic activities, and everywhere we have found a realm of self-contradiction. Fortunately, too, our finding seems to be supported by the general drift of modern philosophy. Kant rested all upon his famous antinomies. Hegel even proclaimed that "contradiction was the moving spirit of the world." Quite recently an eminent French philosopher has scornfully dismissed the intellect as "characterized by a natural inability to comprehend life."¹³ And Höffding ends his latest work thus: "In all our problems we end with an interminable conflict. . . . We cannot solve definitely these problems."¹⁴

But while agreeing with all these grand masters as to the fact of universal contradiction, my interpretation of the fact is the exact reverse of theirs. First, it involves no *paradoxes*. Unlike Kant's interpretation, it does not regard the human intellect as an evil machine producing only illusions and lies. Unlike Hegel's, it does not regard things as perversely bent upon contradicting each other.

Secondly, my interpretation is not mere

¹³ Bergson: *Creative Evolution*, p. 165.

¹⁴ *Problems of Philosophy*.

guess-work, but rigidly verified. In all realms of human experience we have found a constant tendency to simultaneous movements in exactly opposite directions. *Therefore*, in human experience there must be two diverse agencies at work — animal sensation and a rational soul. That is as certain as that the same object cannot at the same instant move both up and down.

When that simple truth works its way into the speculative mind, souls will come in fashion again.

CHAPTER V

FREEDOM

The controversy concerning "free will" has assumed such immense proportions without reaching any satisfactory conclusion, that it may seem absurd to attempt a settlement of the question in one short chapter. Nevertheless, from our present vantage-ground I venture upon the task. If perchance I succeed, we shall have a third and final proof of the soul's existence.

My attempt divides into two tasks. The first will seek to negative the determinist's argument; the second, to give a full, positive proof of freedom.

SECTION I. THE INCONCEIVABILITY OF FREEDOM

The stronghold of determinism is the contention that freedom is unthinkable. No satisfactory answer has ever been made to that contention. Nay, more than that, *the greatest minds among libertarians have openly conceded this inconceivability*. Kant said: "Freedom is

only an idea of reason and therefore its objective reality is doubtful . . . we cannot comprehend the practical unconditioned necessity of the moral imperative." So Fichte said: "We make this resolve not from any theoretic insight, but in consequence of a practical interest. I will be independent, hence I resolve to consider myself independent." Also Sir William Hamilton: "How the will can possibly be free must remain to us, under the present limitation of our faculties, wholly incomprehensible."

Not all libertarians have been thus frank. But all have virtually succumbed to this deterministic attack: some by ignoring it; some by futile replies.

Let me quote here from an author who has recently put forth a large volume in defense of freedom. But in the middle of it he surrenders thus: "Why does the free self choose one line of action rather than another? The only choice left us here appears to be between an antinomy and an infinite regress, which is a veritable Scylla and Charybdis. If the self be ever so free to choose, choice without a reason — or cause or preference — for that choice is unthinkable. If the reason be sufficient it is determining. So we come to the antinomy of a free yet determined choice which seems self-contradiction. If it be suggested that self ex-

ercises control over the reason which controls the choice, then there must be a reason for such control, and so on *ad infinitum*.”¹

Thus completely at a loss, our author makes the usual flimsy appeal to consciousness, and finally says: “The reality of freedom lies deeper than argument.” Now plainly that is a complete surrender: if it is true, the other four hundred pages of the book are but so much waste paper. The same may be said of the other writers mentioned; and a host of others unmentioned. Why write countless books and waste time in endless argumentation in the vain endeavor to prove the reality of something absolutely incomprehensible?

But from our present point of view, it is easy to see the error underlying all these surrenders to determinism. *A free cause, instead of being unthinkable, is the only thoroughly comprehensible cause.* It is the only true or complete type of causation. From that type all imperfect or partial causes are deviations due to their defects and obscurities. To quote again wise old Aristotle's maxim: “By the concept of the straight we discover both the straight and the crooked.”

But the determinist exactly reverses this golden rule. He would mutilate the most perfect form of finite causality — the human — in

¹ Ballard: *False and True Determinism*, p. 240.

order to make it like the lowest, most defective form, to wit, the causality of inert, irrational things. Such causes seem hardly worthy of the name, to be rather mere effects, each mysteriously linked to its antecedent and so on into the midnight of the infinite past.

And yet this transparent fallacy, this degrading of causality to its emptiest form, is the tap-root of determinism. Thus Hume said: "According to the doctrine of liberty or chance, this (causal) connection is reduced to nothing. . . . As the action proceeds from nothing in him that is durable and constant and leaves nothing of that nature behind it . . . therefore a man is as pure and untainted after having committed the most horrid crimes as at the first moment of his birth." That is to say, a free or perfect cause is unthinkable. If an act has not been compelled by some previous act or event, it has been done by chance — that is, by nothing. And this nonsense is still being rehearsed by the most eminent determinists, *e.g.*, McTaggart, Bain, Fullerton, Hobhouse, Rashdall, etc., as their chief disproof of freedom.

SECTION II. REASON AND CAUSE

The determinist is led still further astray by that vagueness of popular speech which confounds reason and cause. But between these two there is this deep and wide distinction —

reason compels belief, but not action. One may have the best of reasons for doing an act and yet fail to do it. Only when the will or spirit issues its fiat does the action ensue.

But the determinist curiously transfers this compulsion from the belief to the act. He argues, reason compels one to believe that he ought to do a certain act, therefore it compels him to do it. But that on its very face seems absurd. And, yet even eminent libertarians succumb to it. Thus Sir William Hamilton says: "A determination by motives cannot to our understanding escape from necessitation." And Dr. Ballard, in the passage already quoted, insists that in choosing there must be some reason that compels one to choose this rather than that. In the same way many others virtually give up the fight for freedom.

Coupled with this there is another ambiguity equally disastrous. There are two kinds of choice radically different from each other, the one mechanical, the other ethical. The former — pleasure accepted, pain avoided — is purely automatic, almost unconscious. The latter is the rejection of the pleasant at the command of duty; it is self-denial, the choice of the straight gate and the narrow way. This absolute contrariety between the two choices has often been noted. Thus Wundt, *e.g.*, says: "Let m be a motive for and n a motive against

some volition; the result will be not $m-n$ but may be a double or treble m or n ." Or as Prof. Poynting states it: "A body does not yield to the strongest force. It moves in the direction of the resultant of all the forces. But the will finally takes one course and the motives prompting to other courses all drop out of action." ²

Determinism, then, rests upon a threefold fallacy. (a) It assumes that a free or perfect cause is inconceivable; on the contrary, *it is the only cause which is fully and clearly conceivable*; all imperfect or partial causes depend upon it for their explanation. (b) It assumes that having a reason for an action makes that action compulsory; which is absurdly untrue. (c) It confounds mechanical with ethical choice. Extirpate these three fallacies and the whole fabric of determinism instantly collapses.

SECTION III. THE POSITIVE PROOF OF FREEDOM

But more is needed than a mere refuting of the determinist argument. Positive proof is demanded; all the more because the gift of freedom is unique and unparalleled in the world's phenomena.

Up to the present time no such proof has been proffered. Instead, there has been only

² *Hibbert Journal*, 1909, p. 743.

much loud assertion that we are conscious of our freedom. But mere assertion proves nothing. It is open, too, to Spinoza's sarcasm that man thinks himself free because he does not know the causes that compel him.

But we have now reached a point where a solid proof can be obtained, resting upon verified facts and not upon mere assertions. For in Chapter II, it was shown that the four main constituents of a perfect or self-sufficient cause were infinitude, unity, rationality and self-limitation for the sake of others. Now, man is manifestly possessed of the three last named characteristics. (1) He is a unit, both as an animal organism, and — as was shown in Chapter III — as a thinking, conscious being. (2) He is certainly rational; although woefully prone to lapse into irrationality. (3) He has the power, which he exercises more or less, of limiting or denying himself for the sake of others.

But, of course, he is not infinite. And so the crucial question is this: Does the lack of infinitude debar him from being, not an absolutely, but a relatively perfect or free cause? To that question there can be but one sensible answer. Man's finiteness does not necessarily debar him from a finite or limited freedom. And mark now that *this is the only kind of freedom which he possesses*. On every side he

is hemmed in by laws and restrictions which he can no more defy or evade than he can arrest the revolution of the earth on its axis. But in the limited sphere of morals, man is free. He cannot be compelled to act wrongfully. For an act that is compelled cannot be morally wrong. Its compulsoriness obliterates its ethical quality.

Man, then, has all but one of the four essential characteristics of a perfect or free cause. But the lack of that one — infinitude — is no bar to a finite freedom. Much corroborating evidence might be given if space permitted. But this alone is full, positive proof of human freedom.

And this assurance of freedom is the final guarantee of the soul's existence. For it shatters that ancient error — three thousand years old in India, and revived in the Hegelian or culminating phase of modern idealism — which denies the individuality of the soul and pictures it as the flitting shadow of an infinite energy. Thus Hegel affirms that "the mind as finite has no existence." Or as Haldane says: "Both the external world of things and the spiritual world of persons have their existence, somehow or other, in only one Supreme Existence."³

But we have escaped from this wild Hindu

³ *Mechanism, Life and Personality*, p. 74.

illusionism by reversing the method of research. We began by studying causality in its most perfect type — not in its most imperfect and therefore least knowable forms. Thus we were enabled to demonstrate the existence of God. Passing thence to human causality we found in it a threefold proof of the soul's existence: (1) as an agent unifying the flux of thought and feeling; (2) as an activity in polar contrast with that of mere body; (3) as a free cause, finite indeed, but still closely akin to the divine.

Thus philosophy is saved from sinking back into the old Hindu illusionism. And it can safely leave the problem of the nature of material things to be solved by experimental science.

CHAPTER VI

IMMORTALITY

SECTION I. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

If anything exists, then souls exist. Of that fact we have now gained ample evidence. But it has been maintained even by devout believers in the soul's reality — Pfleiderer, for example — that this proves only the bare *possibility* of its continuance after the death of the body. It gives hope, but no firm assurance. But I now seek to show that we can go farther than this; that from our present vantage-ground we can logically reach as firm an assurance of the life beyond as we have of most things on this side of the grave.

Consider first the polar contrast between body and mind. Long ago Occasionalism raised a problem which after three centuries of dispute still remains unsolved: How can entities so utterly disparate interact with each other? It is a stumbling-block against which the rival philosophies have fallen helpless.

But mark now this indubitable and most significant fact. All this dark, inexplicable mys-

tery in the relationship of matter and mind, or body and soul, *concerns only their unity and not their separation*. More than that, this mystery of the union illumines the nature and the certainty of that separation which takes place when the body "returns to the dust and the spirit to the God that gave it." Death is the dissolution of the millions of cells aggregated in the body; but the soul being a perfect unit and a unifying agent is indissoluble, deathless. *The present life, then, is the real mystery*; it is the dark wilderness through which man gains the promised land of immortality.

(2) Consider also the mind's supremacy over the body. It governs the body's movements, checks its evil appetites, subdues its passions, guards it against dangers. There seems, indeed, to be hardly any limit to this majestic power of the spirit. Unlike other energies, the more it does, the stronger and more triumphant it becomes. It can convert even the flames of martyrdom into "a bed of roses."

But the denial of immortality involves the preposterous paradox that when the body is aged and infirm, ready to dissolve into dust, then the spirit loses its mastery. *It succumbs when the body is at its weakest*. The victor surrenders to a vanquished and retreating foe. It, too, dissolves — not merely into dust, but into nothingness. Surely that is nonsense.

The considerations presented above seem to me to have great weight. But there is another line of evidence which gives a still deeper and fuller assurance of immortality. It is based upon the principle which it was Hegel's chief merit to have emphasised, namely, that "the Whole is the Truth." In other words, the various branches of knowledge are not isolated fragments, but are so interconnected as to form one organic system. Hence there can be no surer test of any supposed knowledge than that it thoroughly conforms with all other spheres of knowledge.

Such a proof of immortality I now seek to outline. To this end let us roughly divide knowledge into three spheres — religion, morality and physical science.

Religion. That the belief in immortality is an essential element in all religion, no one will seriously deny. Even the Buddhist believes in a future life; although his atheism has made that life seem so hideous that he wildly strives to escape from it into "Nirvana." And a few European thinkers have so far followed in Buddha's footsteps as to affirm immortality without accepting God's existence. But these are abnormal exceptions. Normally the development of the one belief goes hand in hand with that of the other. As Rashdall says:¹ "Jew-

¹ *Theory of Good and Evil*, II, p. 218.

ish theology only reached the level of pure Monotheism a very little before a developed belief in Immortality (as distinct from a mere survival, which could hardly be called life, in a shadowy Sheol) began to appear." Still more clearly does this law hold in Christian history. As the belief in God advances or recedes, so does the conception of a future life. The perfect correlation of the two beliefs, then, is obvious. All history teaches it.

Morality. Some moralists protest against linking ethics with the doctrine of immortality. Like Spinoza, they insist that virtue is its own reward, and vice its own punishment. Or like Hume, they urge that the absence of compensating justice in this world is a very poor proof of its presence in another and unknown world.² But they all take too narrow a view of the future life as merely a place of rewards and punishments. Kant's insight was much deeper and truer. He saw, as in a vision, the primary and profounder meaning of the future life. It was something more than a penitentiary for some and a palace for others. Immortality was the guarantee of a nobler development for man than could be obtained under earthly conditions. Or as he put it, "The highest good is practically possible only on the presupposition of the immortality of the soul."

² Pffeiderer: *Philosophy of Religion*, IV, p. 168.

There is, however, one serious flaw in Kant's argument. His illusionism led him to an agnostic theory of God and the soul. Thus he unconsciously tore down the foundation of his argument for immortality. That foundation we have now restored. The existence of God and the soul have both been proved. Kant's argument is thus finally perfected. The belief in Morality and the belief in Immortality have been shown to be so closely interrelated that neither can be destroyed without destroying the other.

Science. The conflict of religion and science was at first inevitable. For they were opposite tendencies; the one was engrossed with the invisible, the other with the visible. But now a harmony, like that of music, begins to manifest itself between them.

(1) Consider the supreme principle of modern science — the doctrine of evolution. At first religion protested fiercely against the new doctrine as atheism. To-day it generally accepts Fiske's saying: "The more thoroughly we comprehend the process of evolution, the more we are apt to feel that to deny the everlasting persistence of the spiritual element in man is to rob the whole process of its meaning." ³

(2) The second grand triumph of modern

³ *Destiny of Man*, p. 116.

science was the discovery of the Conservation of Energy. Science, at first engrossed with the visible, has become a revelation of the invisible. For the various forms of energy which it has brought to light are not perceptible to the senses. They are inferred from the effects they produce. And the law of conservation is but a more exact statement of what religion proclaimed long ago. "The things which are seen are temporal; but the things which are not seen are eternal."

(3) There is a third feature of the scientific movement which tells much for my purpose. Lotze concludes his Logic with a fervid hope that Science would not always be content to merely *predict* but would seek to *comprehend*. But despite its wonderful progress since then, science shows no sign of such a change. On the contrary, it insists more firmly than ever that its mission is to predict, not to explain. And to this norm our knowledge of immortality conforms. It is not a mere possibility; it is predictable with full assurance. But its details cannot be comprehended; "neither have entered into the heart of man the things which God hath prepared for them that love him."

(4) It is too early to judge concerning the efforts to prove immortality by "psychical research." A score of centuries intervened between the crude glimpses of evolution gained by

Aristotle and St. Augustine and the final triumph of Darwin. A host of discoveries had to be made before the gap between surmise and certainty could be closed. But science moves far more swiftly now than then. And I believe that at no very distant day it will show us that the dead are still alive.

At any rate, we have now seen that science and the belief in immortality are in full accord. Both are built upon the same triple basis. (1) The law of the conservation of energy is the same as the idea of immortality; only it is expressed in terms of physical science. (2) Evolution — aye! even natural selection — reveals the real trend of life beyond the grave. (3) Science, as predictive, but unable to fully comprehend, precisely mirrors our knowledge of the world to come.

The belief in immortality, then, *is in full accord with the three most fundamental principles of modern science.* With religion and morality it not only accords, but is indispensable to their very existence. Thus all spheres of human knowledge in unison proclaim the immortality of the soul. Whoever denies or doubts that immortality arrays himself against the entire organized system of human knowledge — fights against that Whole which is the Truth.

Nothing has so much hindered human progress and welfare as man's pugnacity and nar-

row-mindedness. The theologian, the moralist and the scientist all look askance at each other, ever ready for a dispute. But there is no more need of a quarrel between these three forms of knowledge than between three branches of one tree. They all spring from a common root, the thought of causality. And they all point to a common sky — the many-colored dome of immortality.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Doubt is expanding. Formerly it was confined to religion and morals. To-day it spreads its black shadows over all science — even over geometry. For example, take that monumental work, “The Foundations of Science.” Its author, Poincaré, one of the greatest mathematicians of all time, there contends with wonderful skill and power that the first principles of science have no logical basis, cannot be verified. They are mere conventions framed and accepted by scientists, because they are “convenient,” because “without them science would be impossible” (p. 173). So far no one has really answered him.

And there is no possible answer, I think, except one derived from the fundamental principle proved in our first chapter. Consider, *e. g.* his chief paradox, one upon which he lavishes a hundred pages, one that is the tap-root of all the rest — the denial of space. The gist of it he gives in these italicised words: “*If there were no solid bodies, there would be no geometry*” (p. 73).

Now our fundamental principle was that to know any reality aright, we must think it in terms of cause and effect. Thereby we proved the reality of space. Poincaré saw one-half of this truth; that space could be known only through its effects — the spatial relations of solid bodies. But he did not see the other half; that we could not know these spatial relations if we had no knowledge of that one, infinite space upon which they depend.

We conclude, then, that one and the same principle — that of causality — guarantees our knowledge of both the spiritual and the physical. We have no more reason, then, for doubting the existence of souls than for doubting the truths of geometry.

THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE
STAMPED BELOW

AN INITIAL FINE OF 25 CENTS

WILL BE ASSESSED FOR FAILURE TO RETURN
THIS BOOK ON THE DATE DUE. THE PENALTY
WILL INCREASE TO 50 CENTS ON THE FOURTH
DAY AND TO \$1.00 ON THE SEVENTH DAY
OVERDUE.

MAR 20 1934 REC'D LD

MAY 18 1958

APR 28 1945

REC'D LD

30 NOV 1971

APR 5 1963

Dec 12 '49 RE NOV 15 1968 2

18 Jan '56 BH

JAN 5 1956 LU

16 Jan '57 CC

REC'D LD

JAN 8 1957

17 May '58 DM

YB 22933

304129

BD421

H4

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY

